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A New Dimension to EU Pharma Antitrust  
Product Hopping and Unilateral Pay for Delay 
 
Pay for delay settlements are currently high on the competition law enforcement agenda in the 
pharmaceutical sector. The focus in these investigations is on the collusive nature of the 
agreements between a brand company and generic companies and the associated 
anticompetitive potential. However, this article moves the discussion away from the commonly 
recognized collusive anticompetitive potential, advocating for the expansion of antitrust 
scrutiny of pay for delay settlements to unilateral conduct. It argues that pay for delay 
settlements could be used as a “facilitator” for a broader unilateral strategy by the brand 
company such as product hopping – the intentional or even coercive switch of patients to a 
reformulated version of the original brand drug in anticipation of generic drug competition. 
The proposed theory of harm is not only in line with the European approach to related conduct 
in AstraZeneca and the CMA’s decision in Reckitt Benckiser, but also finds support in the US 
Second Circuit’s judgment in State of New York v. Actavis from May 2015. 
Keywords: Pharmaceutical antitrust, product hopping, pay for delay settlement, unilateral 
conduct, theory of harm. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Agreements in the pharmaceutical sector by which the brand pharmaceutical company pays the 
generic entrant to stay off the market as part of a patent settlement, so-called pay for delay 
settlements, are currently at the centre of attention in Europe. On a European level decisions 
against Lundbeck1 and Johnson & Johnson2 and Servier3 have been issued in 2013 and 2014. 
On 8 September 2016, the General Court upheld the European Comission’s decision in 
Lunbeck in its entirely, finding pay for delay settlements to be a restriction by object.4On a 
national level, the Competition and Markets Authority has issued its first pay for delay 
infringement decision against GlaxoSmithKline and a number of generic companies in 
                                                          
1 Commission Decision of 19 July 2013 (Case AT.39226 - Lundbeck) OJ C (2013) 3803 final. 
2 European Commission Press Release, IP/13/1233, 10 December 2013, Antitrust: Commission fines Johnson & 
Johnson and Novartis € 16 million for delaying market entry of generic pain-killer fentanyl, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1233_en.htm (accessed 17 July 2016). 
3 European Commission Press Release, IP/14/799, 9 July 2014, Antitrust: Commission fines Servier and five 
generic companies for curbing entry of cheaper versions of cardiovascular medicine, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-799_en.htm (accessed 17 July 2016). 
4 Case T-472/13 Lundbeck v European Commission [8 September 2016] (not yet reported) 
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February 2016.5 Predominately, the competition authorities’ current enforcement efforts rest 
on Art. 101 TFEU, challenging the anticompetitive harm caused by the collusive behaviour 
between a brand company and one or more generic companies that are paid off by the brand 
company in order to stay out of the market. This notion that pay for delay settlements facilitate 
collusion is in line with the longstanding enforcement against these types of agreements in the 
United States and is also widely recognized in the academic literature. In fact, a considerable 
amount of ink has been spilled over this kind of collusive behaviour by academics from around 
the world.6 However, recently it has been argued that European pay for delay settlements have 
a reduced anticompetitive potential compared to United States, if the inquiry is based on the 
collusive behaviour of the parties involved; or at least require a detailed albeit structured 
effects-based analysis.7 Such a different approach is required due to the regulatory differences 
in the respective pharmaceutical sectors. Whereas, a brand company in the United States can 
foreclose the entire market concerned by paying off a single generic company, achieving 
market foreclosure in Europe is more difficult or at least highly dependent on the actual market 
structure. Compared to the United States, the European regulatory framework, does not block 
subsequent generic entrants despite the conclusion of a pay for delay settlement in the market. 
                                                          
5 Competition and Markets Authority Press Release, 12 February 2016, CMA fines pharma companies £45 
million, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-fines-pharma-companies-45-million (accessed 17 July 
2016). 
6 Among others Kevin D McDonald, Patent Settlements and Payments that Flow the "Wrong" Way: The Early 
History of a Bad Idea 15 Antitrust Health Care Chronicle 2 (2002); Marc G Schildkraut, Patent-splitting 
settlements and the reverse payment fallacy 71 Antitrust Law Journal 1033 (2003); Herbert J Hovenkamp, Mark 
D Janis and Mark A Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 Minnesota Law 
1719 (2003); Thomas F Cotter, Refining the “Presumptive Illegality” Approach to Settlements of Patent Disputes 
Involving Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley 87 Minnesota Law Review 1789 
(2003); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust limits and patent settlements 34 Rand J. Econ. 391 (2003); Anne-Marie C Yvon, 
Settlements between brand and generic pharmaceutical companies: A reasonable antitrust analysis of reverse 
payments 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1883 (2006); C. S Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement 
as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 New York University Law Review 1553 (2006); Mark W Murphy, Red flag or 
red herring? Reverse payments and the settlement of pharmaceutical patent litigation, 4 European 
Competition Journal 541 (2008); Michael Kades, Whistling Past the Graveyard: The Problem with the Per Se 
Legality Treatment of Pay-for-Delay Settlements, 5 Competition Policy International 142 (2009); C. S Hemphill, 
An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 
Colum. L. Rev. 629 (2009); Michael A Carrier, Unsettling drug patent settlements: A framework for presumptive 
illegality, 108 Michigan Law Review 37 (2009); Michael A Carrier, Solving the Drug Settlement Problem: The 
Legislative Approach, 41 Rutgers L.J. 83 (2009); Michael A Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical 
Settlements: The Missing Dimension of Product-Hopping, 62 Florida Law Review 1009 (2010); Phillip E Areeda 
and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust law: an analysis of antitrust principles and their application (2. ed. Aspen 
Law & Business, New York, NY 2013) ¶2046; Aaron Edlin and others, Activating Actavis, 38 Antitrust Health 
Care Chronicle 16 (2013); Herbert J Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and the Supreme Court’s 
Actavis Decision, 15 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science and Technology 3 (2014). 
7 Sven Gallasch, ‘Activating Actavis in Europe – the Proposal of a “Structured Effects Based” Analysis for Pay for 
Delay Settlements’ Legal Studies (2016) forthcoming.  
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Foreclosure purely based on the pay for delay settlement’s collusive nature is only possible in 
concentrated markets where the brand company is able to pay off all viable generic entrants. 
Therefore, this article moves away from the common understanding that the anticompetitive 
harm of pay for delay settlements can only be caused by collusive behaviour and argues that 
these kind of agreements can also facilitate unilateral anticompetitive conduct by the brand 
company, such as product hopping.  
It is recognized in the literature that the brand company can evade the threat of cheaper generic 
competition which would decrease its profits significantly and at the same time would benefit 
the consumers greatly, by establishing a “new” version of the brand drug on the market prior 
to generic competition.8 In the past, this kind of product hopping was facilitated by regulatory 
peculiarities that were exploited by the undertakings, as in AstraZeneca9 or in the CMA’s 
Reckitt Benckiser decision.10 Using a pay for delay settlement as a facilitator for unilateral 
conduct such as product hopping instead, provides the brand company with a lot more 
‘flexibility’ as it is no longer reliant on regulatory loopholes that can be closed by means of 
legislative reform. In essence, a pay for delay settlement provides the brand company with the 
potential to “buy” sufficient time to safely switch to a new version of its drug at the latest 
possible time without having to fear generic competition that would impede such conduct. The 
topicality of this issue can be highlighted by internal Lundbeck documents that have been 
discovered during the European Commission’s investigation against the company in relation 
to pay for delay settlements.11 
Before the article sets out the proposed theory of harm and establishes that the finding of an 
abuse of a dominant position would be consistent with the previous product hopping cases, it 
is setting the scene. It first addresses the reduced anticompetitive potential of collusive pay for 
                                                          
8 Alan Devlin, Exclusionary Strategies in the Hatch-Waxman Context, Mich. St. L. Rev. 632, 658 (2007); Steve D 
Shadowen, Keith B Leffler and Joseph T Lukens, Anticompetitive product changes in the pharmaceutical 
industry, 41 Rutgers L.J. 51 (2009); Bengt Domeij, Anticompetitive marketing in the context of product 
switching, in Hans H Lidgard (ed), Nordic Perspectives on Competition in Innovation markets (Maria Magle 
Publishing, Lund, 2013) 132; also European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report (2009). 
para 1010. 
9 AstraZeneca (Case COMP/A. 37.507/F3) (2005) upheld by Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v European Commission 
[2010] ECR 00 and Case C-457/10 P AstraZeneca v European Commission [6 December 2012] (not yet 
reported). 
10 Decision of the Office of Fair Trading: Abuse of a dominant position by Reckitt Benckiser Healthcare (UK) 
Limited and Reckitt Benckiser Group plc Decision (No. CA98/02/2011) (2011). 
11 Commission Decision of 19 July 2013 (Case AT.39226 - Lundbeck) (n 1) para 808. “The immediate goal after 
launch [of escitalopram] will be to switch loyal Citalopram prescribers into loyal escitalopram prescribers”.  
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delay settlements in Europe when compared to the United States and suggests to broaden the 
scrutiny of these kind of settlements as part of a unilateral strategy of the brand company. 
Secondly, the article defines product hopping before it critically assesses two prominent 
European product hopping cases; the second abuse in AstraZeneca, and the UK CMA’s 
decision in Reckitt Benckiser. Having done so, the article then turns to the discussion of pay 
for delay settlements as facilitator for unilateral conduct by brand companies; developing the 
theory of harm and arguing that that such conduct should not be able to be justified by the fact 
that the product hop is facilitated by a patent settlement, allegedly reducing litigation cost and 
increasing legal certainty. 
 
2. EU pay for delay settlement in a broader unilateral context 
 
Competition law scrutiny of pay for delay settlements focuses predominantly on the 
anticompetitive nature of the agreement between the parties and the possible infringement of 
Art. 101 TFEU. A possible theory of harm regarding the use of pay for delay settlements in a 
broader unilateral context based on Art. 102 TFEU seems not yet to be considered by the 
European Commission or national competition authorities. Although an inclination to 
competition law scrutiny under Art. 101 TFEU is understandable following the longstanding 
enforcement practice and experience in the United States as well as recent US Supreme Court 
judgment in Actavis12, a viable theory of harm for unilateral conduct by the brand company 
should not be easily dismissed; especially, considering the fundamental differences between 
the pharmaceutical regulations in the United States and Europe. In order to develop a unilateral 
theory of harm based on pay for delay settlements, this section first introduces and briefly 
discusses the differences between the two respective regimes, which in turn has a significant 
impact on the anticompetitive potential that can arise from pay for delay settlements 
individually.   
It is widely accepted in the academic literature and amongst policy makers that pay for 
delay settlements are used as a vehicle to foreclose a relevant market by paying off potential 
generic entrants.13 In return for a certain value transfer from the brand company to the potential 
generic entrant, the generic entrant agrees not to enter the market before a certain date that has 
                                                          
12 FTC v. Actavis 133 S.Ct. 2223 (2013). 
13 See fn 6 
 6 
 
been stipulated in the settlement agreement.14 It can therefore be argued that the generic 
exclusion from the market is caused by value transfer rather than by the exclusionary nature of 
a valid patent. A value transfer from the brand company to the generic entrant would normally 
only be expected, if the parties to the settlement regard the patent in question as invalid. 
Consequently one would expect generic entry and the potential payment of damages and 
litigation cost by the brand company. However, following a pay for delay settlement, the 
potential generic entrant asserts the validity of the patent. Nonetheless, the generic company 
receives payment from the brand company. Assuming the patent would be valid and 
enforceable, a value transfer from the brand company to the potential generic entrant would 
not be necessary to achieve the exclusion. The payment thus arguably goes in the “wrong 
direction”.15 
The anticompetitive potential of this conduct does not arise from the settlement itself 
but rather the regulatory environment in which it takes place. In the United States, the 
regulatory framework is based on the so-called Hatch Waxman Act.16 According to this 
framework, a generic company can apply for drug approval with the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) prior to the expiry of the brand company’s patent as long as the generic 
company notifies the brand company about its intended entry. This notification is achieved 
through a so-called “Paragraph IV certification” which needs to list all related patents that have 
been filed by the brand company with the FDA in its “Orange Book”.17 This Orange Book 
requirement creates a patent linkage between the FDA’s consideration of the drug’s safety and 
efficacy and the related economic considerations stemming from patent protection.18 The 
‘Paragraph IV certification’ also allows the brand company to challenge the generic application 
on grounds of patent infringement, as the generic application constitutes an act of patent 
infringement.19 Should the brand company decide to do so, the FDA decision on the generic 
application is postponed by 30 months in order to allow the parties to resolve their patent 
                                                          
14 Areeda and Hovenkamp (n 6) ¶2046c. 
15 Mark A Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 92 (2005). 
16 The purpose of the Hatch Waxman Act is to incentivise generic companies to enter the market for a given 
drug prior to the expiry of the brand company’s patent by challenging the validity of the patent.  
17 The Orange Book is the FDA’s register of all patents in relation to every brand drug that is registered with the 
FDA. 
18 The pharmaceutical company ‘shall submit information on each patent that claims the drug or a method of 
using the drug that is the subject of the new drug application or amendment or supplement to it and with 
respect to which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the 
owner of the patent engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug product. 21 CFR §314.53 (b). 
19 C. S Hemphill and Mark A Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
(2011) 77 Antitrust Law Journal 947, 952. 
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dispute in court.20 If the generic company would be successful in its patent challenge, the FDA 
would grant the generic applicant a period of 180 day generic exclusivity, as a reward for the 
incurred risk of patent infringement litigation and the associated litigation cost.21 During this 
period of generic exclusivity, the FDA is not allowed to grant any further generic applications 
for the same drug. It is this situation that is exploited by pay for delay settlements as ‘the Hatch-
Waxman Act has been interpreted to give 180 days of generic exclusivity to the first generic 
company to file for FDA approval, whether or not that company succeeds in invalidating the 
patent or finding a way to avoid infringement’.22 The brand company can therefore “pay-off” 
the generic entrant for not entering the market. In fact, the situation is even worse, as the start 
date of the generic exclusivity period can be stipulated in the settlement. One has to remember 
that no other generic application can be approved by the FDA during this period, leading 
ultimately to the foreclosure of the market for as long as the period of generic exclusivity has 
not expired.  
The situation in Europe is different. Unlike in the United States, where a pay for delay 
settlement with a single generic company can foreclose the entire relevant market, the relevant 
European market generally cannot be foreclosed by paying off a single generic entrant. Most 
importantly, the European drug safety regulators that approve brand and generic drugs and 
grant market authorizations do not take economic factors, such as patent rights of the brand 
company, into consideration. Under EU law, such a patent linkage is not permitted.23 Following 
European secondary legislation,24  no other criteria apart from those regarding public health - 
such as the safety, the quality, and the efficacy of the relevant drug - should be taken into 
consideration when deciding upon the application for a market authorization.25 The European 
authorities are thus not constraint by a regulatory bottleneck akin to the Hatch Waxman Act, 
in particular the Orange Book requirement. Even if the brand company enters with the first 
                                                          
20 ibid. 952. 
21 Elizabeth S Weiswasser and Danzis Scott D. ‘The Hatch-Waxman Act: History, Structure, and Legacy’ (2003) 
71 Antitrust Law Journal 585, 603. 
22 Hemphill and Lemley (n 19) 948. 
23 ‘In the interest of public health, authorisation decisions under the centralised procedure should be taken on 
the basis of the objective scientific criteria of quality, safety and efficacy of the medicinal product concerned, to 
the exclusion of economic and other considerations.’(emphasis added) Regulation (EC) No. 726/2004 of the 
European parliament and of the council laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and 
supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency 
(2004) Recital 13. 
24 Ibid. Art. 81; Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Community code 
relating to medicinal products for human use, OJ L 311 (2001) Art. 126. 
25 European Commission (n 8) 130. 
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generic applicant into a pay for delay settlement, subsequent generic companies are not 
prevented from entry, as long as they can satisfy the relevant safety and efficacy requirements. 
Although they might or are even likely to face patent infringement litigation, subsequent 
generic entrants are not barred from entry based on the regulatory regime. It is therefore also 
not necessary to incentive the first generic applicant with a period of generic exclusivity to 
reward him for the patent challenge, as multiple generic companies can simultaneously 
challenge the same patent. Ultimately, a pay for delay settlement with a single generic entrant 
is at least very unlike to cause anticompetitive market foreclosure based on the regulatory 
environment alone. Anticompetitive foreclosure would therefore only be possible in very 
limited cases where the brand company manages to pay off all viable generic entrants at the 
same time.26 This situation is highly dependent on the competitive nature of the market and is 
not facilitated by the European regulatory regime for drug approval.  
However, it is far more likely that a pay for delay settlement in Europe would only 
cause a delay in generic entry. A generic delay is also difficult to sustain as a stand-alone 
strategy for the brand company due to likelihood of multiple subsequent generic entrants 
challenging the relevant patent. One should therefore consider, whether it is possible for the 
brand company to use pay for delay settlements in a broader unilateral strategy, potentially 
referred to as part of the brand company’s “product lifecycle management”27 , in which the 
settlement can facilitate anticompetitive foreclosure. Scrutinizing such unilateral conduct under 
Art. 102 TFEU would also have a further strategic advantage. In an investigation against a 
brand company regarding the alleged abuse of its dominant position, the European Commission 
is more likely to receive cooperation from the generic company that entered into the pay for 
delay settlement, as only the brand company is subject of the investigation. In fact, the 
European Commission could initiate proceedings under Art 101 TFEU as well as under Art. 
102 TFEU and could use its discretion to drop the Art. 101 TFEU proceedings against the 
generic company in return for their cooperation.29 This is also not likely to be an undue 
                                                          
26 Gallasch (n 7) 10. 
27 Product lifecycle management is the business activity of managing a company’s products across their 
lifecycle, from the very first idea of a product all the way through until it’s retired and disposed of. The main 
objectives are the increase of product revenue, the reduction of product related costs, and the maximisation 
of the product portfolio’s value for customers and shareholders. John Stark, Product lifecycle management: 
21st century paradigm for product realisation (Decision engineering, 2nd Springer, London, New York 2011) 1. 
29 The European Commission not only has the discretion to decide how to conduct its investigation but also can 
decide only focus in its infringement decision only on a part of the case, so only on the unilateral of the brand 
company instead of the collusive behaviour. See Wouter Wils, Discretion and Prioritisation in Public Antitrust 
Enforcement, in Particular EU Antitrust, (2011) 34(3) World Competition 353, 364. 
Enforcement 
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prioritization of the enforcement, as the investigated conduct is based on unilateral strategy that 
has been facilitated by the agreement between the brand company and the generic company. 
For example, assume that the pay for delay and product hop take place one year prior to the 
expiry of the patent. In this scenario the European Commission would have the choice to 
investigate all parties to the pay for delay settlement under Art. 101 TFEU with the potential 
anticompetitive harm being the delay of generic competition for one year; or it could 
investigate the brand company for unilateral product hopping which was facilitated by the pay 
for delay settlement with the potential anticompetitive harm being the delay of generic 
competition for several years due to the “renewed“ brand exclusivity of the follow-on drug. 
This example nicely illustrates thatthe predominant anticompetitive potential stems form the 
brand company’s unilateral conduct and not the pay for delay settlement itself. Due to the 
different focal point, an investigation of a brand company’s abuse of dominance should 
therefore be seen as an alternative enforcement strategy against conduct that rely on pay for 
delay settlements rather than a complementary approach to the analysis of pay for delay 
settlements under Art. 101TFEU.  
An example for such broader unilateral conduct by the brand company that goes beyond 
the competitive practice of “product lifecycle management” is the “second” abuse in 
AstraZeneca, concerning the deregistration of a market authorization in order to avoid generic 
entry and to facilitate AstraZeneca’s product switch to a second generation version of its brand 
drug Losec. This type of conduct has also been referred to as ‘product hopping’. 
In the remainder of this article it is argued that an adapted version of this conduct, in which the 
deregistration of the marketing authorization is replaced by a pay for delay settlement can lead 
to the similar anticompetitive result and therefore should be regarded as an abuse of the brand 
company’s dominant position. Before this article turns to the discussion of whether product 
hopping could be facilitated by a pay for delay settlement, constituting an infringement of Art. 
102 TFEU, it first explains the phenomenon of product hopping and critically analyses the 
European Courts’ approach to this phenomenon in the ‘second’ abuse of the AstraZeneca 
judgment as well as the CMA’s decision in Reckitt Benckiser.  
 
 
3. Product hopping defined and explained 
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Product hopping is an exclusionary strategy involving the brand company’s reformulation of 
its brand drug.30 These reformulations can take place in different ways. The brand company 
might decide to change the form of the drug, switching from a capsule to a tablet or injectable.31 
Another possibility is to slightly change the chemical composition of the drug, while keeping 
the actual active ingredient the same.32 Alternatively, the brand company might also combine 
two or more pharmaceutical compositions in a single drug that used to be marketed 
separately.33 Although brand companies always claim that these ‘second generation’ drugs are 
an improvement to the original drug, the clinical benefit of these improvements is sometimes 
at least questionable. In the EU pharmaceutical sector inquiry generic companies have indeed 
claimed that there are no improved therapeutic effects and that some of the second generation 
drugs show little if any innovation and limited if any additional benefits.34  
 The timing of the product hop is crucial in order to develop the full anticompetitive 
potential. The strategy is more successful for the brand company if the switch takes place before 
generic entry.35 For the United States, Carrier nicely highlights the importance of timing by a 
number of case studies about the brand drugs Provigil and Androgel.36 The fact that the 
European pharmaceutical sector is not immune to the same considerations by brand companies 
is showcased by quotes from internal documents that came to light during the pharmaceutical 
sector inquiry. 
"The launch of [our second generation product] is a challenge, not experienced until 
now, as generics firms, […] press onto the market with all force and as we have to fear the loss 
of our patent […]. This means each patient that is not switched quickly enough to [our second 
generation product] is forever lost to the generics. Once the patient is switched to [our second 
generation product] the physician does not have to, cannot and will not switch him to a generic, 
and what is more important: the pharmacist cannot substitute!! "37 
The generic entrant is faced with a number of problems, if the brand company brings the second 
generation drug to the market before a generic version of the original brand drug.  The generic 
                                                          
30 Carrier (n 6) 8. 
31 Shadowen, Leffler and Lukens (n 8) 24. 
32 ibid. 24. 
33 ibid. 25. 
34 European Commission (n 8) para. 994. 
35 Carrier (n 6) 11. 
36 ibid. 13, 19. 
37 European Commission (n 8) para. 1028. 
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drug can be marketed, if it has already been approved, but it cannot be substituted for the second 
generation brand drug, as it lacks in bioequivalence.38 If the original brand drug would be 
withdrawn from the market, the generic company might have to forgo entering the market, as 
it would no longer be considered as a substitute for the second generation drug.39 Alternatively, 
the generic company could consider to reapply for generic approval of the second generation 
drug.40 However, such a re-application might be prevented by the data and marketing 
exclusivity period which has been granted to the second generation drug, in case the brand 
company has obtained additional patents. The brand company will try to switch as many 
consumers as possible to the new second generation drug that is still patent protected, as it will 
incur considerable value losses both in terms of smaller volumes and reduced prices, if cheaper, 
generic versions of the first product come on the market before or simultaneously with the 
switch to the follow-on product.41 Physicians or pharmacists would not be allowed to provide 
already switched patients with the generic substitute for the original brand drug. So, even if the 
original brand drug is not withdrawn from the market, the negative impact is likely to be 
significant for the generic entrant’s revenue but also more importantly for consumer welfare, 
as consumers are deprived of cheaper generic choices. 
 Competition law scrutiny of this product hopping strategy should thus focus not 
necessarily on the product switch itself but rather on the brand company’s behaviour that 
ensures the successful switch by facilitating the timing of the switch prior to generic entry or 
by exploiting pharmaceutical regulation to deter generic substitution. The product switch itself 
should rather be seen as trigger for increased competition law vigilance, if the switch takes 
place a few years prior to patent expiry. Examples of such conduct are the deregistration of 
marketing authorizations in AstraZeneca and the withdrawal of Gaviscon Original from the 
NHS sales channels in Reckitt Benckiser.  
 
4. Product hopping facilitated by regulatory gaming 
 
                                                          
38 This means that the generic company must establish that the generic product is composed of the same 
substances – in qualitative and quantitative terms – and has the same pharmaceutical form as the originator 
product which has already been granted marketing authorisation. ibid. para. 860. 
39 Devlin (n 8) 657. 
40 ibid. 657. 
41 European Commission (n 8) para. 1010. 
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Having defined product hopping and explained the underlying intuition of its anticompetitive 
potential, the article now discusses the rationale behind the abuse in AstraZeneca and in Reckitt 
Benckiser.  
 
In AstraZeneca, the product hopping was achieved by the selective deregistration of 
marketing authorizations for AstraZeneca’s brand drug Losec. The European Commission’s 
finding of abuse was based on AstraZeneca’s so-called “Losec-Post-Patent-Strategy” which 
consisted of three elements: (1) the extension of the Losec product line by Losec MUPS, which 
is Losec in a tablet form instead of a capsule42; (2) the raising of technical and legal barriers to 
entry designed to delay generic entry which was accomplished through the deregistration of 
the marketing authorizations for Losec capsules  in several Member States; and (3) the 
introduction of a new generation product called esomeprazole, which was supposed to have 
significant clinical benefits compared to omeprazole, the active pharmaceutical ingredient in 
Losec.43 
In order to switch as many patients as possible from Losec to Losec MUPS before 
generic entry, AstraZeneca raised barrier to entry by the selective deregistration of 
AstraZeneca’s marketing authorization for Losec. According to the legal framework at the 
time, an abridged drug application for generic drugs by which the generic company could rely 
on the clinical trials and the necessary scientific literature was only available if the marketing 
authorization for the brand drug was in force on the date on which the generic abridged drug 
application was filed.44 With the withdrawal of the marketing authorization AstraZeneca had 
created a regulatory obstacle, 45 preventing generic companies from using the abridged 
application procedure and therefore delayed generic entry and increased the generic 
companies’ costs to overcome this barrier to market entry.46 Based on this conduct the 
European Commission found that 
 
                                                          
42 It needs to be kept in mind that the extension of the product line by itself does not constitute an abuse as 
‘an undertaking, even in a dominant position, [can employ] a strategy whose object it is to minimise erosion of 
its sales and to enable it to deal with competition from generic products is legitimate and is part of the normal 
competitive process’ Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v European Commission (n 9) para. 804. 
43 For the purpose of the finding of abuse only the first two points are relevant. ibid. para. 803.  
44 ibid. para. 828.  
45 Joesph Drexl, AstraZeneca and the EU sector inquiry: When do patent filings violate competition law? Max 
Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law Research Paper No. 12-02, 10, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2009276 (accessed 17 July 2016). 
46 Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v European Commission (n 9) para. 829. Generic companies could still enter the 
market but were unable to rely on AstraZeneca’s clinical data. 
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‘the requests for deregistration of capsules in […] combination with the tablet/capsule 
switch (i.e. the launch of Losec MUPS tablets and the withdrawal from the market of Losec 
capsules), as part of its LPPS Strategy with a view to preventing, or at least delaying, generic 
market entry [resulted in an abuse of AstraZeneca’s dominant position]47 
 
The abuse is therefore not to be found in the extension of the product line and the product 
switching itself, but in the delay of generic competition into the market.48 This delay allowed 
the brand company to introduce a follow-on brand drug and attempt to switch as many patients 
as possible to the new follow-on brand drug. Where successful the brand drug would not face 
significant competitive pressure from generic entrants as these could only enter with generic 
version for the brand drug but not for the follow-on brand drug, which is effectively replacing 
the brand drug on the same market.  In the view of the Court of Justice, a dominant undertaking, 
having the special responsibility not to distort competition 
 
‘cannot therefore use regulatory procedures in such a way as to prevent or make more 
difficult the entry of competitors on the market, in the absence of grounds relating to the 
defence of the legitimate interests of an undertaking engaged in competition on the merits or 
in the absence of objective justification.’49  
 
AstraZeneca’s plea that it was entitled to withdraw its marketing authorization was rejected by 
the Court of Justice. First of all, it was held in general terms that no relationship exists between 
the lawfulness and compliance of a certain type of conduct under one body of law and potential 
immunity from competition law scrutiny.50  The availability of a deregistration request and its 
legality under Directive 65/65 did not bar the Court from finding an abuse of Art. 102 TFEU.  
Secondly, the Court of Justice rejected for a number of reasons AstraZeneca’s argument that 
                                                          
47 Case COMP/A. 37.507/F3 AstraZeneca (n 9) para. 860. This finding was upheld by the General Court Case T-
321/05 AstraZeneca v European Commission (n 9) para. 671-696 and by the ECJ Case C-457/10 P AstraZeneca v 
European Commission (n 9). para. 129-141 holding that ‘the deregistration of [Losec’s markting authorization] 
[…] by which AstraZeneca intended […] to hinder the introduction of generic products […] does not come within 
the scope of competition on the merits.’ at [130]. 
48 In fact the product switching as such is expressly permitted by the Court; ‘as a strategy whose object it is to 
minimize the erosion of its sales and to enable it to deal with competition from generic products is legitimate 
and is part of the normal competitive process, provided that the conduct envisaged does not depart from 
practices coming within the scope of competition on the merits, which is such as to benefit consumers.’ ibid. 
para 129. 
49 ibid. para 134. 
50 ibid. para 132. 
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the Commission failed to apply the IMS Health criteria which only afford competition law 
intervention in ‘exceptional circumstances’.51 AstraZeneca’s conduct in question was not 
regarded as comparable to the conduct in IMS Health which concerned a compulsory licence 
for the use of the copyright protected “brick structure” by a competitor.52 The possibility to 
request the deregistration of a marketing authorization was also not deemed to be an equivalent 
to an exclusive property whose exercise could be justified as a means of ‘effective 
expropriation’.53 The Court held that after the expiry of the relevant period of data exclusivity, 
the clinical data is regarded to be in the public domain, allowing generic applicants for the same 
drug to rely on this data for marketing authorization purposes.54 In fact, AstraZeneca’s conduct 
rendered the abridged application procedure for generic applicants unavailable solely for the 
purpose to create barriers to entry for generic applicants and to delay such entry, thus 
constituting an abuse of AstraZeneca’s dominant position. 
 
In Reckitt Benckiser, the brand company had successfully marketed the acid reflux drug 
Gaviscon for years and had also introduced a second generation version of the drug, called 
Gaviscon Advance. In order to facilitate the prescription of the follow-on drug, Reckitt 
Benckiser delisted the original drug Gaviscon from the NHS sales channels – again, conduct 
that the company was entitled to under the law.55 However the withdrawal led to the situation 
that physicians no longer had the choice between prescribing Gaviscon and Gaviscon Advance 
using their IT system. Even more importantly, prescribing physicians could no longer 
successfully search for generic alternatives for Gaviscon by hitting “Ctrl +G”. If a generic 
version is found, the physician can issue an open prescription using the generic name. This 
allows the pharmacists to either prescribe the orginial brand drug or the usually cheaper yet 
                                                          
51 ibid. para 142. 
52 ibid. para 148. 
53 ibid. para 149. 
54 According to Advocate General Mazak ‘the primary purpose of Directive 65/65 is to safeguard public health 
while eliminating disparities between certain national provisions which hinder trade in medicinal products 
within the Union, and it therefore does not, as claimed by the appellants, pursue the same objectives as Article 
82 EC in such a way that the application of the latter is no longer required for the purposes of ensuring effective 
and undistorted competition within the internal market’. ibid. para 133. 
55 Reckitt Benckiser Group plc Decision No. CA98/02/2011 (n 10) para. 2.127; Under the Best Practice Guide 
agreed between the Department of Health and the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, a 
manufacturer may wish to withdraw a product from the market for a number of reasons such as changes in 
medical practice, commercial decisions or problems in obtaining active ingredients. 
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equivalent generic version.  Gaviscon Advance, however, was still under patent protection and 
did not have any generic alternatives yet.56  
Internal documentation referring to project “White Tiger” further highlighted Reckitt 
Benckiser’s intention to strategically use the withdrawal of Gaviscon to pre-empt ‘the 
publication of a generic name corresponding to Gaviscon, and to ensure that the NHS Gaviscon 
portfolio was not exposed to the full generic competition associated with the widespread 
issuing of open prescriptions;’57 meaning prescriptions using the generic drug name which 
allow the pharmacist choose the cheapest generic version available.  
As in the case of AstraZeneca, timing was of the essence. The withdrawal of Gaviscon needed 
to be completed before a generic name for Gaviscon was granted. The importance of this timing 
and the associate risk can again be illustrated by internal documentation referring to Project 
White Tiger stating that, 
 
'If we do not act Peptac will be in a position to take control of the UK Alginates market 
and our entire Gaviscon NHS franchise will be under threat. It is imperative that we maintain 
control of our own destiny and do not allow the competition to dictate the future of one of RB's 
power brands.'58 
 
Similar to AstraZenca, Reckitt Benckiser was running a two stage strategy, (1) the introduction 
of a follow-on drug and (2) the timely withdrawal of the original drug which which was aimed 
at doing ‘everything possible to encourage [phyisicians] and pharmacists to upgrade patients 
to Gaviscon Advance instead’.59 
The CMA regarded the deletion of Gaviscon from the NHS prescription list as conduct 
outside the scope of competition on the merits and thus a restriction of competition – directly 
referring to the AstraZeneca decision.60 The authority rejected Reckitt Benckiser’s argument 
that it has always intended to convert sales from Gaviscon to Gaviscon Advance as part of its 
normal “life cycle management strategy”.61 In fact, the conversion of sales is not by itself 
anticompetitive or “outside” normal competition. It is rather the combination of the switch and 
                                                          
56 ibid. para. 6.16. 
57 ibid. para. 6.18. 
58 ibid. para. 2.180. 
59 ibid. para. 2.169. 
60 ibid. para. 3.42. 
61 ibid. para. 6.136. 
 16 
 
the timing of the withdrawal, which was at the time a loss-making decision and therefore 
irrational absence the ulterior motive of hindering the ascendancy of generic competition.62  
 
What both cases have in common, is the fact that the anticompetitive conduct is not the 
product switch as such but rather the combination of the product switch with the exploitation 
of the regulatory framework that facilitated the switch. However, at the same time, the necessity 
of having to rely on highly specific regulatory loopholes is also the “downside” of this kind 
conduct. The very abuse might work once, but the loophole is likely to be closed swiftly by 
means legislative reform, as in AstraZeneca. 63 
 
 
5. Product hopping facilitated by pay for delay settlements 
 
However, relying on a pay for delay settlement in order to facilitate product hopping instead 
of having to rely on pharmaceutical regulation and a specific regulatory loophole, allows brand 
companies to achieve the same goal. Furthermore, the use of pay for delay settlements makes 
the ‘anticompetitive’ product hopping strategy a lot more flexible for the brand company. 
Increased flexibility for potential anticompetitive conduct should generally lead to increased 
competition law scrutiny. 
 
 
a. Theory of harm 
 
The theory of harm centres on the brand company’s delay of generic competition that allows it 
to switch patients from a soon-out-of-patent-protection drug to a patent protected follow-on 
drug without the need for any notable therapeutic improvement as it does not have to fear any 
                                                          
62 ibid. para. 6.136. 
63 Council Directive 65/65/EEC has been since repealed by Council Directive 2001/83/EEC and further amended 
by Directive 2004/27/EEC. According to Art. 10 of Council Directive 2004/27/EEC the deregistration of a 
marketing authorisation can no longer prevent generic applicant from relying on the necessary clinical trial 
data of the brand company. It is now sufficient that the brand drug has received marketing authorisation for its 
drug at some point in the past, so that the authorisation does no longer have to be active at the time of the 
generic application. 
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competitive pressure. Ultimately, consumers are deprived of the choice between the branded 
follow-on drug and the generic version of the original brand drug.  
It is known to be vital for the brand company to introduce the follow-on brand drug on the 
market before generic competition for the original brand drug arises.64  The introduction of a 
follow-on brand drug does not constitute an abuse itself. After all, the drug could constitute an 
improvement from the original brand drug and should be seen as part of the normal competitive 
process to mitigate the erosion of sales.65 If the follow-on drug would be a real improvement 
over the original drug, consumers would switch to the follow-on drug despite a generic 
presence in the market. This can be regarded as a good indicator to measure the level of 
improvement of the follow-on drug over the original66 and is a reason for why the product 
switch itself should not be an abuse. It allows the consumer “to vote with their feet” by choosing 
the drug that is most beneficial to them.67 
It would be a legitimate attempt to switch patients to the follow-on drug by introducing 
the follow-on brand drug to market after the brand company’s data exclusivity has lapsed but 
before the 2-year period of market exclusivity has expired.68 During this period, the brand 
company does not have to fear generic competition, as generic companies are allowed to 
develop and produce the generic version, however, cannot market it yet. Although the brand 
company might argue that this could lead to the cannibalization of profits69 from the original 
brand drug that is still patent protected, one should always take into consideration that the 
follow-on brand drug is likely to be still under data exclusivity and is thus shielded from generic 
competition for a longer period. 
 
The combination of a product switch with a pay for delay settlement could however turn the 
generally ‘procompetitive product switch’ into an ‘anticompetitive product hop’. Drawing an 
analogy with AstraZeneca, a pay for delay settlement could replace the closed loophole of 
deregistration in the product switching scenario in AstraZeneca.  
                                                          
64 European Commission (n 8) 360. 
65 Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v European Commission (n 9) para. 804. 
66 Devlin (n 8) 666. 
67 For a similar argument see Walgreen v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals, 534 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D.D.C. 2008) 
‘Courts and juries are not tasked with determining which product among several is superior. Those 
determinations are left to the marketplace.’ (emphasis added)  
68 Every brand drug that has been approved after 30 October 2005 receives 8 years of data exclusivity, 2 years 
of market exclusivity with a possible extension of a further year (so-called 8+2+1 formula). 
69 Shadowen, Leffler and Lukens (n 8) 45. 
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As it has been discussed above pay for delay settlements in the European context do not 
necessarily provide the brand company with the opportunity to foreclose the market by paying 
off a single generic competitor. The foreclosure of the relevant market depends heavily on the 
competitive structure of the market and the number of generic companies that are capable of 
entering in the market and of posing a viable threat to the brand company’s monopoly profits.  
The brand company could, nonetheless, attempt to delay the most viable and imminent 
entrant by a pay for delay settlement in order to gain sufficient time to introduce the follow-on 
brand drug on the same market as the brand drug.  The settlement could ensure that the brand 
company can introduce the follow-on brand drug on the market without the fear of generic 
competition and can attempt to switch as many patients to from the original brand drug to the 
new follow-on brand drug at a later stage than under the normal competitive process, even after 
the expiry of the marketing exclusivity period.  
In contrast to the procompetitive product switch, the brand company delays generic 
entry by paying off the generic company to a point in time after the expiry of market 
exclusivity. This has a number of implications. (1) Under normal circumstances the paid-off 
generic company could have potentially entered the market providing consumers with a drug 
choice based on the therapeutic benefit. With generic competition in the market, the switch of 
patients would be less likely to be successful on a large scale or would have to be undertaken 
prior to the expiry of the marketing exclusivity period. This is the case as patients would be 
more likely to be switched to the generic version of the original brand drug than to the follow-
on brand drug due to the significant price erosion that is associated with generic entry. 
Consumers would have been likely to switch to the cheaper generic version of the original 
brand drug than to the follow-on brand drug, assuming the follow-on drug is of limited 
therapeutic benefit. (2) The product hop is also based on the intentional delay of generic 
alternatives rather than the actual improvement of the follow-on drug.70 In fact, meaningful 
therapeutic improvement is not required due to the lack of generic alternatives. (3) 
Furthermore, the generic delay could also lead to the minimization of the aforementioned profit 
cannibalization as the successful product switch takes place at a point in time when the generic 
company could have already exerted competitive pressure on the original brand drug, which 
would directly benefit consumers. The brand company could thus switch consumers to the 
follow-on drug not only safely, but also at the latest point in time possible; close to the end of 
the patent life instead of the end of the marketing exclusivity period. In essence, the brand 
                                                          
70 See Case C-457/10 P AstraZeneca v European Commission (n 9) para. 130. 
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company gains the ‘best of both worlds’; near optimal profits from for the original brand drug 
and the safe consumer switch to the still patent protected follow-on drug. 
 
This theory of harm finds support in the recent Second Circuit decision in People of the State 
of New York vs. Acatvis.71 In this decision the court upheld a preliminary injunction sought by 
the New York Attorney General against Actavis and its subsidiary Forest Laboratories in 
relation to the product hop from Namenda IR, an Alzheimer drug, to Namenda XR, the 
extended release version that only needs to be taken once a day instead of twice. The court 
distinguished between a “soft switch” and a “hard switch”. Where as “soft switch” concerns 
the introduction of a second-generation drug followed by the attempt to persuade patients to 
switch, the “hard switch” describes the scenario in which the new drug is introduced and 
patients are coerced into the switch due to the withdrawal of the original drug. Importantly, the 
court held that  
 
“neither product withdrawal nor product improvement alone is anticompetitive, 
[however] when a monopolist combines product withdrawal with some other conduct the 
overall effect of which is to coerce consumers rather than persuade them on the merits and to 
impede competition [then the conduct would be anticompetitive].”72 
 
The court also convincingly rejected a number of arguments brought forward by Actavis, 
attempting to justify conduct, such as: the relevant patents bar antitrust liability;73 the superior 
nature of the drug justifies the withdrawal of the older drug;74 the conduct prevents “free-
                                                          
71 People of 52 the State of New York v. Actavis Case No. 14-4624 (2d Cir. May 28, 2015). 
72 ibid. 35 citing Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 (2d Cir. 1979). 
73 quoting the US Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v Actavis 133 S.Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013) that “patent and 
antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the scope of the patent monopoly—and consequently 
antitrust law immunity—that is conferred by a patent,” the court held that the introduction of the new drug in 
combination with the withdrawal of the old drug in the context of the state’s drug substitution law goes 
beyond the scope of the patent protection conferred by the individual patents for Namenda IR and Namenda 
XR. ibid. 53. 
74 The court held that the alleged superior nature of the new drug would not be significant in this case, as the 
anticompetitive conduct in question originates from the coercive nature of the conduct of forcing patients to 
switch by withdrawing the original drug. ibid. 34. This finding is also in line with the reasoning in Walgreen v. 
AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals, 534 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D.D.C. 2008) where it has held that ‘Courts and juries are 
not tasked with determining which product among several is superior.’ 
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riding” of competitors;75 and finally that the application of antitrust laws to product hopping 
would deter innovation.  
 The last point is especially noteworthy from a more general policy perspective. Here 
the court suggested that 
 
“immunizing product hopping from antitrust scrutiny may [in fact] deter significant 
innovation by encouraging manufacturers to focus on switching the market to trivial or minor 
product reformulations rather than investing in the research and development necessary to 
develop riskier, but medically significant innovations.”(emphasis added)76 
 
In doing so, the court seems to have taken into careful consideration concerns voiced by a 
number of academics in relation to a potential antitrust inquiry into the degree or even necessity 
of the product innovation that led to the drug improvement of the follow-on drug.77 Moreover, 
the court’s judgment suggests that the brand company is not forced to keep producing the 
original drug, indefinitely, alongside the follow-on drug, putting an additional burden on the 
company. This can be inferred from the fact that the court upheld the injunction, which required 
Actavis to produce the original brand drug for a mere 30 days post generic.78   
It can be derived from this discussion that the court’s reasoning is in line with the 
general premise of the decisions by the ECJ and the CMA,79 providing robustness to the 
proposed theory of harm. 
 
 
  
                                                          
75 The court rejected the “free-riding” argument as this kind of conduct in the context of the pharmaceutical 
sector was expressly granted by law; in fact accepting the argument would have contradicted the purpose of 
the Hatch Waxman Act, which allows generic competitors to rely on the brand company’s clinical data in an 
abbreviated drug application. ibid. 45. 
76 ibid. 50. 
77 According to Dogan and Lemley ‘product hopping antitrust suits [could] require courts to inquire into product 
design choices, something antitrust judges take pains to avoid; they also raise concerns about courts second-
guessing judgments by agencies and legislators about how best to balance competition and innovation in 
regulated markets.’ Stacey L Dogan and Mark A Lemley, ‘Antitrust law and regulatory gaming’ (2009) 87 Texas 
Law Review. 4; see also Cheng which regards product hopping to raise minimal market antitrust concerns, ‘as 
launching new product formulations and engaging in successful advertising campaigns are consistent with the 
unfettered market competition that antitrust law promotes.’  Jessie Cheng, ‘An Antitrust Analysis of Product 
Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1512’ 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1471. 1510. 
78 State of New York v. Actavis (n 71) 24. 
79 Supra p. 15. 
 21 
 
b. Pay for delay has the same effect as regulatory gaming  
 
Although the potential anticompetitive effect from the proposed theory of harm would be 
generally very similar to the ones discussed above, one has to consider the differences in the 
means by which the anticompetitive effect is achieved. Whereas the product switching in the 
previous cases was facilitated by an abuse of the regulatory procedure that was deemed to be 
outside the scope of competition on the merits, the product switch in the proposed theory of 
harm is facilitated by pay for delay settlements which could also be regarded as a patent 
settlement between the brand company as intellectual property proprietor and a generic 
company that intends to enter the market prior to patent expiry. The settlement could thus be 
regarded as a justified means by the brand company to protect its intellectual property right and 
investment as well as to ensure its effective expropriation. After all, the generic company wants 
to gain market entry prior to patent expiry. It could also be argued that the settlement generally 
lowers risk and increases certainty, thereby increasing investment. 
Yet, it has to be kept in mind that pay for delay settlements are no ordinary patent settlements.80 
The settlement is not based on the validity of the patent but rather on the value transfer from 
the brand company to the potential generic entrant. It would not be necessary for the brand 
company to make a substantial value transfer to the generic entrant, if its patent would be strong 
and valid. In this case, the generic entrant should be deterred from entry by the patent itself. 
Even if one would accept that the proprietor can enforce its patent in any way as long as the 
patent is not yet expired one has to consider the underlying nature of the intellectual property 
right. Intellectual property policy does not confer an unfettered “right to exclude” but rather 
the right to “try to exclude”.81 Intellectual property rights should be by no means 
unchallengeable from an intellectual property perspective and should not be immune from 
competition law scrutiny. In fact the US Supreme Court has held in its Actavis judgment that 
a pay for delay settlements falls outside the scope of a patent should be scrutinized by the US 
antitrust laws.82 In a similar vein, the General Court found that  
‘even if the restrictions contained in the agreements at issue potentially fell within the scope 
of Lundbeck’s patents, in that they could also have been obtained through litigation, the contested 
decision rightly finds that this was merely a possibility at the time the agreements at issue were 
                                                          
80 Sven Gallasch, ‘Debunking the pay for delay myth: pay for delay settlements are no ordinary patent 
settlements’ (2016) 15 Competition Law Journal 89. 
81 Shapiro (n 6) 395. 
82 FTC v. Actavis (n 12). 
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concluded. Replacing that uncertainty in relation to whether or not the generic undertakings were 
infringing and to the validity of the applicants’ patents with the certainty that the generic 
undertakings would not enter the market during the term of the agreements at issue constitutes, as 
such, a restriction on competition by object in the present case, since that result was obtained 
through a reverse payment’84 
 A pay for delay settlement is thus not part of the normal competitive process and infringes 
competition law.  
In addition, one also needs to take a step back and remember that the pay for delay 
settlement in this scenario is only part of a broader unilateral strategy. The anticompetitive 
effect is not caused by the conclusion of the settlement with the potential generic entrant. It is 
rather achieved by the product switching to an incremental follow-on drug facilitated by a “plus 
factor” that enables the switch without having to fear any generic competition at a period of 
time at which generic competition is possible from a pharmaceutical regulation perspective, 
i.e. after the expiry of marketing exclusivity. Whereas in AstraZeneca, the “plus factor” was 
the abuse of the deregistration procedure, and in Reckitt Benckiser the withdrawal of the drug 
from NHS sales channel, the “plus factor” in this theory of harm is the pay for delay settlement 
that makes the product switching fall outside the scope of competition on the merits. Even if 
one would assume that a pay for delay settlement would not infringe Art 101 TFEU – a situation 
that is unlikely following the General Court’s decision in Lundbeck – it should not be forgotten 
that the lawfulness of certain behaviour under one body of law has no impact on the 
determination of abusive behaviour under competition law.85‘In the majority of cases, abuses 
of dominant positions consist of behaviour which is otherwise lawful under branches of law 
other than competition law.’86 
 
Attempts to justify the conduct based the need to protect an intellectual property right or its 
effective expropriation in order to legitimately protect an investment should be rebutted. 
As already alluded to earlier, the brand company should not be able to rely on the exclusionary 
nature of the patent, arguing that it should be allowed to defend its patent by means of patent 
infringement litigation, also when the litigation is concluded by a settlement.87 A similar 
                                                          
84 Case T-472/13 Lundbeck v European Commission (n 4) para. 401. 
85 Case C-457/10 P AstraZeneca v European Commission (n 9) para 132. 
86 Ibid. 
87 See Case T-472/13 Lundbeck v European Commission (n 4) para. 390 ‘Although the applicants were entitled 
to enter into settlements with the generic undertakings in order to avoid the costs of potential litigation, they 
could not, on that ground, substitute their own assessment of the validity of their patents and the infringing 
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argument was brought forward in Microsoft.88 However, Microsoft’s plea that it would be 
allowed to refuse to grant access to its technology to third parties based on the fact that the 
technology was patent protected was rejected by the General Court. The Court held that this 
would lead to the conclusion that refusal to licence an intellectual property right could never 
constitute an abuse, which would contradict the ECJ’s judgments in Magill and IMS Health.89 
In the similar vein it could be argued that it should not be allowed to shield any patent 
enforcement from competition law scrutiny because of the exclusionary nature of the patent.90  
Furthermore, arguments that the conduct would reduce the incentive to innovate should 
be rejected. Contrary to Microsoft which dealt with the refusal to licence an intellectual 
property right, the brand company is not curtailed in putting an innovative product to the market 
or is forced to provide a generic company with a licence. Instead, the company is prevented 
from shielding the market from generic competition, which allows the brand company to make 
the transition from an original brand drug to a follow-on brand drug without any competitive 
constraint from generic companies. The brand company should also not be able to argue that 
the pay for delay settlement which facilitates the product switch would realize efficiencies to 
the benefit of the consumers, as the main purpose of a pay for delay settlement is to keep 
cheaper generic alternatives to the original brand drug off the market.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has argued that pay for delay deals can bring rise to unilateral, as well as bilateral 
anticompetitive outcomes and that scrutiny of pharmaceutical antitrust should be widened 
accordingly. Pay for delay settlement should not only trigger competition law scrutiny with a 
focus on collusive conduct between the brand company and the generic company or companies. 
Instead, pay for delay settlements could be used as a means to an end for the brand company 
                                                          
nature of the generic undertakings’ products for that of an independent judge while paying the generic 
undertakings to comply with that assessment and refrain from entering the market for a certain period.’. 
88 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v. Commission [2007] ECR II-3601. 
89 ibid. para.690 In Magill and IMS Health the ECJ stated that refusal to licence can constitute an abuse of a 
dominant position.  
90 This would circumvent antitrust scrutiny of potential anticompetitive conduct such as vexatious patent 
litigation such as the European Commission’s investigation against Rambus for their “patent ambush” strategy 
which has been concluded by a commitment decision RAMBUS (Case COMP/38.636 Commitments decision)  
OJ C30/17 (2010), or the investigations against Samsung in relation to standard-essential patents European 
Commission Press Release, IP/12/1448, 21 December 2012,  Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of 
Objections to Samsung on potential misuse of mobile phone standard-essential patents, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1448_en.htm (accessed 17 July 2016). 
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to succeed with a broader unilateral strategy, which would justify an investigation under Art. 
102 TFEU. A pay for delay settlement could turn the general legitimate attempt of the brand 
company to switch consumers to a new follow-on drug into an anticompetitive conduct. It 
seems that the European Commission has alluded to this possibility in its Lundbeck decision 
when it was stated that 
 
‘The avoidance of generic sales of citalopram in the United Kingdom before the launch 
of escitalopram, and gaining a year and four months to establish escitalopram in the market 
before widespread generic entry took place in the United Kingdom was […] very important to 
Lundbeck.’91   
 
In the author’s opinion such conduct warrants increased scrutiny, as product hopping facilitated 
by a pay for delay settlement is not constrained by the need to exploit a regulatory loophole, 
which makes the implementation of such conduct more flexible for the brand company. Yet, 
from an enforcement perspective, there is also good news. The detection rate of such conduct 
should be high. Competition authorities should start investigating, if they observe a product 
switch towards the end of a patent life in combination with a potential pay for delay settlement. 
 
 
                                                          
91 Lundbeck (n 1) para 808. 
